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1. Introduction 
The tax on corporations is one which has engendered a great deal of contro- 
versy, concerning both its desirability and its economic effects. One of the 
reasons for the controversy is that the effects of the tax depend critically on a 
number of details, including depreciation allowances and deductibility of 
interest. In my earlier paper (1973), I showed that, with a particular set of 
provisions and in a particular institutional context, in the absence of uncertainty 
the tax was nondistortionary: firms would invest up to the point where the 
marginal return on investment was equal to the rate of interest. This result, 
which cast doubt on much of the earlier theoretical and empirical iterature, has 
aroused some interest and controversy, as evidenced by two recent papers in 
this Journal. I would like to take this occasion to put my result within a broader 
context, and to see how it relates to the questions raised by these other papers. 
The tax on corporations has variously been viewed as a tax on capital in the 
corporate sector, a tax on entrepreneurship in the corporate sector, a tax on 
pure profits in the corporate sector, and a tax on risk taking. To some extent, it 
is all of these, but our understanding of the tax is enhanced if we view the tax 
separately in each of its roles. This we shall do in the following sections. In 
sections 24 we shall assume that there is no risk, so that the peculiar problems 
posed by bankruptcies can be avoided. 
2. The corporate tax as a tax on profits 
A tax on corporate income with immediate write-off of costs and no interest 
deductibility is nondistortionary and is essentially a tax on pure profits. To see 
this, consider and asset yielding an income stream of R(t) for t 2 0 and costing 
C. The present discounted value of that asset before taxation is 
j Re-” dt, 
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where r is the rate of interest. After taxes, if the relevant rate of discount were 
unchanged, with immediate write-off of costs, the net return to investing in the 
project is 
(1 -z)[S ReCrt-C], 
where r is the tax rate. It immediately follows that if a project was worth under- 
taking before, it still is : the tax is completely non-distortionary in its effect. 
We need to argue now that the relevant rate of discount is unchanged. To see 
this, we consider a firm which is contemplating investing a dollar with a (known 
marginal) return in a one period project of i. It can borrow at the rate r to 
finance the investment. The firm is not allowed to deduct interest, but is allowed 
immediate write-off of the expenditure. Thus, the net cost of the project is 
(1 - r), while the net return is 
(1 -z)(l +P)-(1 -r)(l +r). 
Thus, the required marginal rate of return is just i: investment will be carried 
to the point where 
i = r. 
On the other hand, a tax on corporate income with appropriate depreciation 
allowances and interest deductibility is, at the margin, a pure corporate profits 
tax and is also nondistortionary. 
To see this, again consider a marginal one-period investment yielding a return 
of i before tax, (1 -z)i after tax. (The gross return is 1 + i. The value of the asset 
was $1 last period and, by definition, at the end of the period it is worthless. Thus 
the depreciation allowance is $1, and taxable income is just P.) The firm can 
borrow to finance the investment at the market rate r. Thus the project will be 
undertaken if and only if i: > r: again the relevant cost of capital is just the 
before-tax rate of interest. This is the case which I analyzed in my earlier paper 
in somewhat greater detail. 
Indeed, the present discounted value of the tax revenues under these two 
systems are perfectly equivalent: a project yielding a return of i > r yields a 
present discounted value of revenue of 
z(1 + r^) r(P- r) -_-_z=- 
l+r l+r 
under the first scheme, and a present discounted value of revenues of 
z[(l -f-F)-(1 +r>] z(i--r) 
l+r =- l+r 
under the second. 
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In short, any tax scheme which between its interest deductibility provisions 
and its depreciation allowances allows a deduction whose present value is equal 
to the cost of the investment is equivalent to one with immediate write-off, and 
should be interpreted as a pure profits tax. 
3. The corporation tax as a tax on capital 
On the other hand, a tax on corporate income with true economic depreciation 
is also nondistortionary with respect to the choice of projects, and is equivalent 
to a tax on imputed interest income. 
To see this, again consider our one-period marginal project with the return 
(1 + F). True economic depreciation in this case is 1, so after tax return is equal to 
1 +?(I-7). 
On the other hand, by assumption, interest payments are not tax exempt, so that 
the marginal rate of substitution of, say, the owners of the firm will be just 
1+r(l-z), 
where r is the rate at which they can borrow and lend (before tax). Thus, the 
project will be undertaken if and only if 
i.e., 
l+i(l-7) 2 l+r(1-z), 
F 2 1. 
But note that the present value of the tax revenue from the marginal project 
is zF/(l +r), whereas in the previous section, tax revenue from the marginal 
project is z(P- r)/(l + r). 
More generally, we define true economic depreciation as the change in the 
value of the asset 
and 
d= -r’, (1) 
so 
V(t) = s: [R(u)(l -z)+zd] exp [-r(1 -z)(~-t)] dv, (2) 
Ti = r(1 -~)V-R(I)(~ -z)-zd. (3) 
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Substituting (1) into (3), we immediately obtain 
or 
V(l-7) = r(l -z)V-R(t)(l -z), (4) 
3 = rV-R(t). (5) 
Thus the differential equation describing the value of an asset is independent 
of the tax rate; since if the returns to the project terminate in T years V(T) = 0, 
again independent of the tax rate, this means that the value of the project is 
unaffected by the imposition of the tax with true economic depreciation. 
Using (1) and (5), we observe that tax revenue is 
zR-zd = zrV, (6) 
confirming that the tax is, as we suggested, simply a tax on interest income (rV 
is the imputed value of interest income on an asset whose value is V). 
4. The corporate tax as a tax on entrepreneurship 
An individual who establishes a firm and incorporates it (to take advantage of 
the limited liability rules, or of the special tax treatment of corporations, to be 
noted below) may decide not to ‘withdraw’ from the firm his entire imputed 
wage, but rather to reinvest it in the firm. In that case, the corporation tax is in 
effect a tax on (imputed) wage (entrepreneurial) income. 
Since the individual has the option of withdrawing the income from the firm, 
and thus avoiding the corporate tax, we must inquire into why such an individual 
would elect to have the firm retain the earnings. Since the analysis is essentially 
the same as that in our earlier study, we only sketch the argument. 
In the absence of uncertainty, we assume that the individual, either personally 
or in his corporate guise, can borrow at the market rate r. If interest payments 
are tax exempt, he will borrow up to the point where the marginal return equals 
the rate of interest. 
The real distortionis in the return to the individual’sentrepreneurship. Consider 
a wholly owned firm, which the individual is planning to sell in T years. Assume 
it pays out a dollar to the individual, and the individual then reinvests the dollar 
in the firm. In the absence of taxation, that would simply be a paper transaction 
with no consequences. With taxation, however, the corporate profits taxes are 
reduced by zc, personal income taxes increased by zP, and that part of the stock 
of the firm purchased is revalued, leading to a reduction in capital gains taxation 
when the shares are sold. If T is a long way in the future, or z,~ is small, we can 
ignore this last effect. In that case, the desirability of paying out the wage depends 
simply on whether the personal rate is below or above the corporation rate. An 
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increase in effort, resulting in an increase in output, is thus subjected to a tax 
which is the minimum of the personal tax rate, and the corporate tax rate plus 
the present value of the tax on the capital gain resulting from the additional 
retention. Thus the effect of the corporation is to reduce the tax rate on entre- 
preneurship from what it would have been had the entrepreneurial income been 
imputed back to the entrepreneur and subjected to the personal tax rate. 
Thus, although there is no doubt that a part of the income upon which the 
corporation tax is levied is really wage income, the fact that this is true only 
reflects the fact that the corporation tax allows a reduction of the tax from what 
it otherwise would have been. 
The assumption of no uncertainty and a perfect capital market was crucial for 
the above analysis. Assume that firm borrowing is restricted; e.g., that firms can 
only borrow up to a given debt equity ratio, CI, and that the constraint is binding :
in the judgment of the owner of the firm, their marginal return to investment is 
safe and exceeds the rate of interest. Then by working a little harder, increasing 
output by a unit, and retaining the earnings within the firm, the firm is able to 
borrow, say, (1 -z,)a. Thus the present value of the total return to increased 
effort is 
(1 -rJ[l +r^(1 -rC)+cl(i-r)(l -ZC)] 
l+r(l-7,) 
It is clear that raising the corporation tax rate will reduce the return on effort 
(entreprenuership), not only because of the direct effect (the tax on wage income) 
but also because it reduces the return to the additional investment which the 
increased effort allows. 
Thus, even when the tax is nondistortionary with respect o investment in a 
first-best world, in the second-best situation with credit constraints, the tax 
affects both labor supply and investment. 
5. The corporate tax as a tax on risk taking 
To the extent that mean returns exceed the safe rate of interest for risky 
investments, the difference may be viewed as a return to risk taking, and a tax 
with interest deductibility provisions may be viewed as a tax on risk taking. But, 
as Domar and Musgrave (1944) argued, the fact that returns which fall below 
the safe rate of return are subsidized by the government means that the govern- 
ment is participating as a silent partner, sharing the risk. Indeed, for the cor- 
poration tax with interest deductibility provision, it can be shown that risk taking 
is always increased. (This should be contrasted with the results where there is no 
interest deductibility provision, where Stiglitz (1969) and Mossin (1968) have 
shown that it is possible that risk taking be reduced.) 
To see this, let e be the return from the risky asset, r the return from a safe 
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asset (the safe rate of return), a the proportion of wealth (assets) invested in the 
risky asset. This may be viewed either as a portfolio problem or as a ‘real’ 
investment problem with stochastic constant returns in each project. Let U be 
the utility function and w,, be the wealth to be invested: the investor maximizes 
EU[w,(l +r+a(e-r)(l -r,))], (7) 
i.e., 
EU’(e-r) = 0. (8) 
(8) can be solved for a(1 -z,): the demand for the risky asset is inversely pro- 
portional to 1 - r,. Mean government revenue is 
ar,(Z-r) > 0. 
Thus, such a tax raises revenue, mean national income, and, perhaps more 
striking, leaves expected utility of all investors unchanged. 
6. The corporation tax and the debt-equity ratio 
In our earlier analysis of the effect of taxation on the debt-equity ratio and on 
the cost of capital, we ignored uncertainty, and thus we ignored the complica- 
tions arising out of the possibility of bankruptcy. But it is exactly these complica- 
tions which, in the absence of taxation, are central in the determination of the 
debt-equity ratio. A complete analysis of this problem would take us beyond 
the scope of this note, but an examination of a particular case may be of some 
interest: this is the case originally discussed by Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
where there are a large number of firms with the same pattern of returns across 
the states of nature. 
We write the (net) returns to a (one-period) investment project as Max 
(0, &z(I)-(1 +i;)B), h w ere 0 is the stochastic variable, F is the nominal return 
to a bond, and B the number of bonds. We let F(0) be the cumulative distribu- 
tion of 0, so n, the probability of bankruptcy, is given by rc = F[(l +F)B/h(l)]. 
We assume that the cost of capital f is a function simply of the ratio h(I)/B, 
since that completely determines the pattern of returns of the risky bonds: 
1 +i = Min { 1 +Y, Bh(Z)/B). (If the value were proportional to h(l), then this 
would be equivalent to assuming that the cost of capital was a function of the 
debt-equity ratio. But of course, the whole point of the exercise is that the value 
may not be independent of the debt-equity ratio.) Thus an individual who owns 




f3 dF-(1 +F)(l -rc) ; 1 -I- &B-l+w,), (9 (1 +‘*)B/h 
‘Obviously, with risk neutrality and individuals differing in their judgments concerning 
returns, we must limit short sales. For simplicity, we assume that no short sales are allowed. 
J.E. Stiglitz, The corporation tax 309 
where w0 is the individual’s initial wealth. Hence 
h 
[ s (10) 
(1 +?)B/h 
[(l+r)+(B/h)i;‘](l-71) = 4. (11) 
Eq. (11) can be solved for h/B, the optimal debt-equity ratio, and then (10) can 
be solved for 1, the equilibrium level of investment. 
How does the corporation tax affect the analysis ? A uniform corporation tax, 
with interest deductibility, simply multiplies all the terms in (9) by l-z, and the 
rest of the analysis is unaffected. Thus, both the debt-equity ratio and the level 
of investment will be unaffected by the imposition of this form of the corporation 
tax. 
7. Equity and efficiency in depreciation allowances 
One of the central determinants we have identified in our analysis of the nature 
of the tax - whether the tax should be viewed as a tax on pure profits or on 
interest income - involved the nature of the depreciation allowance. Discussions 
concerning the appropriateness of one depreciation allowance versus another 
have often confused equity and efficiency considerations, and, as usual, it is 
useful to distinguish the two. 
The basic ‘equity’ principle is that costs of earning income ought to be 
deducted from income to avoid double taxation. 
The basic ‘efficiency’ principle is that the rules for depreciation allowances not 
affect the choice of investment. True economic depreciation and immediate 
write-off of capital expenditures are both depreciation policies which are equit- 
able and efficient in this sense; which is to be preferred depends on whether we 
wish to tax just profits or to tax profits and interest income. Neither, however, 
is generally used; actual depreciation allowances introduce elements of in- 
efficiency as well as inequity. But it is important to emphasize that the tax 
provisions may be roughly equitable (i.e., equitable for the ‘average asset’) but 
still distortionary. 
8. Concluding comments 
The corporation tax has long been a subject of controversy in economics. 
Much of the earlier controversy centered around whether the tax was shifted. 
Such questions necessarily focus on the degree of competitiveness of the given 
market and the nature of the long-run adjustment mechanisms in the economy. 
In this note, I have attempted to center the discussion around the more basic 
issue of exactly what the corporation tax is. The tax has a number of provisions, 
310 J.E. StigIitz, The corporation tax 
which make it inappropriate to simply take either the legislated rate or the 
average rate paid as the appropriate tax rate for economic analysis. We have 
argued that the incidence of the tax depends on exactly what the provisions are. 
In my interpretation of the U.S. tax system, the dominant feature in inter- 
preting the corporation tax is the interest deductibility provision. The implica- 
tions of this provision, as I noted in my earlier article, were unambiguous in the 
absence of uncertainty: the tax should not be viewed as a tax on interest income. 
It is partly a tax on pure profits, partly a tax on entrepreneurship, and partly a 
return on an implicit government partnership in risk taking. Quantitatively, I 
suspect that the third role is the most important. 
What would be the effect of the elimination of the corporation tax, imputing 
the income back directly to the shareholders? For present owners whose 
personal tax rate is identical to the corporation rate, there would be no difference; 
for those with a lower rate, the present discounted value of net (after tax) 
dividends would be increased. If such individuals dominated, then the value of 
shares would increase: owners of securities would experience a capital gain. To 
the extent that the tax should be viewed as a tax on entrepreneurship, and to the 
extent that the original entrepreneurs no longer own shares in their original 
firms, the elimination of the tax would represent a windfall gain to present 
owners; the tax had already been borne by the original entrepreneurs, and 
capitalized in the value of the shares which they had sold. The allocative effect is 
only through the flow of new entrepreneurship. 
On the other hand, to the extent that the tax can be viewed as a return to the 
government partnership in risk taking, the effect would be a reduction in the 
demand for risky assets and a capital loss on existing assets.2 
Similar differences arise in assessing the distributional impact of the tax. To 
the extent that the tax is a tax on entrepreneurship, the characteristics of the 
present owners of the shares are irrelevant for ascertaining the distributional 
impact of the tax; all that needs to be assessed are the characteristics of the 
entrepreneurs. To the extent, however, that the tax is a tax on risk taking if there 
are no credit constraints, then the tax has no effect on expected utility; with 
credit constraints, again because of capitalization, it does have an impact on the 
original entrepreneurs. 
Again, if the tax is capitalized, there is also no issue of horizontal equity with 
respect to present owners of the assets (who are not entrepreneurs) in the 
differential treatment of the corporate and noncorporate sector. And to the 
extent that entrepreneurs can choose whether to incorporate or not, there is not 
an issue of horizontal equity involved in the treatment of entrepreneurship. 
Finally, because the tax may be to a large extent capitalized, the incidence of a 
tax change may be considerably different from the long-run incidence of the tax 
itself. 
ZObviously, just the converse obtains if the personal rate exceeds the corporate rate. 
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